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Theodore Adorno claimed that progress in society and enlightenment in culture are closely connected and it is impossible to have one without the other. However, the application of this principle in a transnational, multicultural environment can lead to two different inferences, which are presented in the books “The End of History and The Last Man” by Francis Fukuyama and “The Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel Huntington. In Hegelian fashion, Fukuyama envisioned the development of international relations as a process of constant convergence in which different customs and worldviews were both annulled and preserved according to the concept of ‘sublation’. The view of Huntington was that different cultural traditions are extremely difficult to reconcile and that the inevitable process of cultural interaction will result in a struggle between a number of civilizations, each of which is based on a range of values that often contradict those of other civilizations. This two contrasting views about the course of development of cultural interaction illustrates a larger and fundamental issue: ‘How are we supposed to organize the course of international relations in a world where differences between people are sometimes more important that the resemblances they share?’ I intend to analyze this problem by presenting the views of Immanuel Kant and contrasting them with my own ideas and the claims of other prominent philosophers.

Kant claimed that there are at least three conditions which are necessary for the establishment of conditions for peaceful interaction between states: first, that they share a republican form of government in which those that pay the price for the decisions of the political authority have an opportunity to participate in them; second, that all states participate in a federation encompassing all states; and third, that they adopt the idea of universal hospitality. These three conditions seem to satisfy the minimum requirement for the foundations on which international order should be organized, but there still remains the question: ‘Is it absolutely necessary to include them in our idea about the principles of organization of cosmopolitan world order?’ According to me, the correct answer is ‘Yes’. First of all, they clearly protect the rights of the individuals in the political community by emphasizing the importance of republican form of government. Secondly, they seem to give equal weight to the dignity of each person regardless of their race, social status or sex. This is achieved by adopting the view of universal hospitality – the idea that states are obliged to treat foreigners according to a set of rules applicable to all persons, including their own citizens. And last, these three conditions seem to be derived by the principles of reason. By applying them, Kant formulated a concept that all rational persons should endorse. Since they cannot resign being part of the group of rational beings, they have a duty to support each concept based on these conditions if other aspects of its structure do not contradict the principles of reason. Formulating a concept based entirely on laws of reason is the only possibility of respecting people as possessing rationality and morality and, in my opinion, Kant succeeded in this difficult task.

According to Kant, the view that states should unite in a state of nations regulated by the abovementioned conditions is underpinned by a number of arguments. First, he seems to make a parallel between people and states being in a state of nature before submitting themselves to laws formulated by the public. Since this lawless condition is characterized either by a war of all against all (according to Hobbes) or by inability to reach reasonable consensus about the problems at hand because of the ‘threat advantage’ stronger individuals (or states) have, the principles of reason dictate that states have to substitute this lawless condition for the organized state of nations. By doing so, nations will be able to live together peacefully without being faced with the constant danger of conducting war with their neighboring states which have not accepted the rules of the international order and are guided in their actions by the principle of self-interest.

Another argument in support of Kant’s concept is the idea that both people and nations should be viewed as autonomous. According to Wolff, autonomy can be described as freedom and responsibility - people are free, but they have the responsibility to constitute their freedom by formulating rules guiding their actions. They do not act in complete lack of rules; rather, they can only act freely if they act according to laws formulated by their reason. This idea is supported by Fichte’s understanding of freedom. According to him, freedom is never absolute, but always limited and conditioned. The ‘I’ can set itself up as an individual only if it is summoned by another individual and if it limits its freedom out of respect for the freedom of the other. Similarly, states can be part of a federation of states (or state of nations) only if they recognize the freedom of the other members and limit their own in order to make the mutual peaceful existence of different interests possible. The ‘civitas gentium’ is possible only via the formulation of efficient international laws regulating relations between states and defending their autonomy.

However, there seems to be a contradiction between the ways Kant envisioned the realization of his concept – in his early pieces of writing on the problem he stated that it was necessary for states to settle their internal problems and then take part in the state of nations, whereas in later passages he seems to support the idea that regulating relations between states should precede the establishment of internal social order formulated by principles of reason. These two views make the discussion of various interpretations of this Kantian concept possible – both the idea that national problems are more important than international ones and the view that serious problems of international political and social relations should be solved with priority to the problems of the particular states. But both this two contradicting positions seem to neglect the fact that in a world with constant economic, cultural and political interaction between all states national problems can easily become international ones and international problems clearly influence the condition of every state in the world. Only by treating them simultaneously and by trying to reconcile the various requirements necessary for their solution can we hope to tackle them in the long term.

The concept of state interaction formulated by John Rawls is a good example of a theory that recognizes the need to address these two issues simultaneously. He divides states (peoples) in four categories – liberal (applying the principles formulated in ‘Justice as Fairness’), decent (illiberal, but unaggressive and not violating human rights), outlaw (aggressive and illiberal) and burdened (unable to solve their particular problems). First, he stated that the system of international relations should encompass both liberal and decent nations since the exclusion of the latter will surely hinder the progress towards their integration into the group of liberal people and will make impossible the establishment of state of nations encompassing all states. Secondly, Rawls simultaneously claims that liberal and decent societies should take the necessary measures when natural rights of people are not respected (as in outlaw nations) or where people are unable to solve the problems they are facing (as in burdened societies). By following these two principles he addresses both problems of the external social order of nations and of the system of international relations without giving priority to either. Thus, he formulates a theory that is able to provide a solution to the complicated problems of the contemporary world of transnational politics.

Some ideas of Max Weber also support the view that national and international problems should be addressed simultaneously. He defines the state as having exclusive control over the legal application of the means of violence over a certain territory. However, this claim can be understood in two different ways – that the state is recognized to have this exclusive control or that it actually possesses the means necessary to establish it. These different interpretations make it impelling to draw a distinction between ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ states. ‘De jure’ states are recognized as such by the international community of states even if they do not actually control the means of violence in their territory, whereas ‘de facto’ states are the ones that are able to impose the legal means of violence over a certain territory regardless of whether they are internationally recognized as having this capacity. If we give preference to national rather than international problems, we may be faced with the perspective of having different groups claiming to fit Weber’s definition of a state (de facto), but lacking international recognition (de jure). This situation may make it impossible for governments to deal with separatist and may endanger not only their authority, but also the possibility of establishing a state of nations. However, if we choose to solve only transnational problems and pay insufficient attention to the particular problems of certain societies, we are faced with the same perspective – inability of governments to assert their authority and the principles of international toleration, which results in failure to achieve the ends this very choice was made for. Hence, national and international problems should be assigned equal weight and neither should have priority over the other.

So we arrived to the idea that international cooperation is necessary but possible only in the context of states being able to deal with their particular problems. But there still remains the question how we will achieve that and whether we possess the necessary means. The progress in various scientific fields in the past few decades and the process of globalization which started as a result of this technical development give us a clear answer to this question - just cooperation between states is possible and can be achieved by the means science gives us. By enhancing our perspectives and giving us better understanding of nature and other people it helps us overcome our prejudices and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective towards the world and other cultures. This possibility of science to overcome national, cultural and social borders was envisioned by Herder in the 17^th century in his concept about science breaking national prejudices by making it necessary to recognize transnational achievements in certain research fields and by providing a common ‘scientific’ language in which members of different cultures can communicate and achieve understanding despite the differences existing between them. This clearly illustrates the role of science for creating mutual understanding that appears crucial for international toleration. However, this view was questioned by C. P. Snow in his famous lecture ‘The Two Cultures’. In it he argued that the aim of the exact sciences is the convergence of knowledge and thus they contribute to the establishment of cultural toleration. In contrast, he claimed that sometimes human sciences tend to emphasize differences rather than similarities and thus they stimulate divergence rather than convergence. However, this inference fails to consider the fact that unlike the exact science, human sciences are not entirely focused on formulating general and unrevisable laws – rather, they tend to focus on particular problems and appreciate the fact that some of them may fail to fit the general norms that are established in the scientific community. Thus, human sciences are not aimed at excluding, but at including. They respect the differences that exist between different people and cultures and tend to preserve them by finding ways to reconcile the contradictions between them, rather than make them fit a general norm and thus destroy their individuality. Thus, they can serve as an effective means to promote international toleration and cooperation.

It is clear that in a world of vast contrasts between different people and nations international cooperation is crucial, but possible only by adopting the principle of toleration. Kant is right in his claim that ‘in accordance with reason’ our societies have to support the formation of the state of nations by placing themselves under public coercive laws. However, we should try not to enforce our views about the structure and the functions of this state of nations in the process of its establishment. Rather, if it is supposed to ‘finally encompass all the nations’ , we should try to enhance our perspective by considering the viewpoints of other nations and trying to integrate them in a discourse process that determines the way in which we are to achieve stable and tolerant system of international relations. This means that we should try to overcome our prejudices and abandon dogmatism in intercultural communication. This is crucial to the achievement of peaceful intercultural dialogue which is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the state of nations. On philosophical level, dogmatism legitimizes fixed patterns of thinking and hinders human progress. On political level, it legitimizes violence which cannot serve as a basis for the state of nations. I believe that the Kantian concept presented in this quotation is devoid of dogmatism and condemns the use of violence in international relations.